Aconscious & Amorphous

From consciousness to affection: Bodies without Control

Towards an ecology of affects

by

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Keynote presentation by Jaime del Val 19 july 18'00

This text was read performatively while walking around the other speakers, who were sitting in tables facing each other.

Issues around consciousness and representation of the body usually take both terms for granted, yet they are part of a dominant tradition of control, not necessary conditions for a livable life. The presentation will oppose the study of consciousness and representation as ontological and epistemological conditions for the body and propose to go beyond their transformation in assuming that bodies are relational motion (affects) that exceed and precede subjectivity and consciousness formations. Aconsciousness would be the act of feeling the affects of the forces that constitute the process of becoming of the bodies, and this relational movement process is always virtual, potential, open to the emergence of the new. Representation on the other hand is a control technology that operates on the fixing of perception as its condition of possibility. The new account of corporeality as amorphous becoming needs the development of new specific technologies of the body that will be at the same time a politics of resistance to control society and setting to motion of ecologies of affects.

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As Rimbaud once said, I is another. I is a moving in between given territories and lines of flight. I is a fiction that tries to hold together the multiplicity of moving bodies... The multiplicity of the body that speaks to you now has been moving in the midst of artistic disciplines, philosophy, technology and activism, and the ideas and practices it will
present to you are the result of such in-betweenness in motion, that so far have resulted in a project for researching and producing relational ecologies, or potential affective metaformations, metaformances.

Issues of awareness, consciousness and representation are foundational to certain constructions of subjectivity, and of bodies understood as unities that appertain to and affirm the domain of the self. Proprioception is inscribed in this tradition of foreclosing the body to a unitary proprietary dimension.

However I will propose that bodies both preceede and exceed such unitary formations through:

- their multiplicity
- their motion
- their becoming
- their relationality

Bodies are not confined to the domain of the self, yet contemporary traditions still dwell on the humanistic dream, and longstading error, of attempting to subdue bodies and their excess, to territories of subjection, scenarios of control, in which the excess of bodies with regard to dominant constructions of subjectivity is either erased as inexistent, or directly condemned to abjection.

What is the scope of construing, researching and affirming accounts of consciousness, awareness and representation, after all? Or rather what is the intentionality of this episteme? What are its conditions of possibility? What does it foreclose and preempt?

Some will argue that a unitary conception of the body, as condition for an identity, is a necessary condition for a livable life. However I will argue that such conditions are required by a particular normative regime and are therefore not only not universal conditions, but ones to be challenged, redefined, perhaps even dissolved, as foundational strata of a longstanding tradition of control, the apex of which may well be contemporary surveillance society, so called information society, where control is effectively hidden behind the façades of leisure and pleasure, where subjects assume surveillance as a form of desire in which individuality is apparently fostered, whereas standardised constructions of affect are virally disseminated and reproduced in the bodies at an unprecedented global scale subduing them to new regimes whose planetary violence is effectively concealed.

It is mostly taken for granted that awareness is of a subject over a body, or of a body over its totality, or at least of a certain totality that holds together through ignoring, excluding, pathologising and erasing what seems incoherent with a particular construct of subjectivity.
I will argue however that bodies are neither the property of subjects nor do they need to hold an image of singularity to sustain a livable life.

Much on the contrary I will argue that the pervasive attempt to place the subject outside of its context has lead to a violent divorce from the environment, be it other subjects, other species or the planet, and thus to the current global violations of this environment, and that for life to be livable we urgently need to develop an ecology of bodies understood as relational processes which are therefore never confined within what we arbitrarily identify as the body that has so far been construed by biology, nor to an individual subject’s field of action. Rather bodies are movements of relation of the forces that constitute reality. As such bodies can never experience themselves from an external, abstract, rational or subjective perspective: bodies are always diffuse and immanent fields of forces, never exterior to themselves.

The kind of awareness through which dominant western traditions have attempted to colonize reality relies upon such an exterior perspective that allows to map, territorialise, control and represent.

But such cartesian perspectives are founded on specific constructions of perception, whose genealogy we can trace in the ways that machines for the production of technical images have been designed and used over centuries in terms of a fixed framing, a distance, an exposure, a focus and a centralized perspective. This particular organisation of the senses, subdued to the primacy of a standardised account of vision is foundational to the subject-object divide and to the longstanding quest for "understanding" consciousness, that is for constructing it as an external process independent from reality.

Awareness cannot be of a whole, since totalities don't exist in this world made of immanent fields of relational forces.

Whatever we identify in reality, be it a subject-body, an urban environment or the planet, has to do with construed images that do not correspond to a reality but conform a reality in itself. Even with regard to such images awareness and consciousness is always relational and expanded: as enactive cognition suggests, consciousness is the effect of relational movement of bodies.

Rather than trying to define a "nature of consciousness" we could start asking ourselves:

- what kinds of consciousness are developed in specific contexts?
- what is the scope of trying to construe specific accounts of consciousness with regard to such contexts?
- what do these accounts of consciousness leave out or behind?
- what other accounts of consciousness can we develop?
- what other accounts of reality can we develop that do not rely upon consciousness, but on relationality?
As different from the humanistic quest for defining human consciousness, recent research presents a fragmented, diffuse, expanded and relational consciousness. Yet in the context of relational ecologies the quest for construing consciousness is perhaps no longer a primary one: the interest now lies in paying attention to the relations, the movements in-between existing nodes of which we are currently aware.

What are these nodes however? What are the forms that we not only perceive but identify? They are also effect of relational processes, of the reiterated movement of perception that produces the fiction of fixity and form.

The cartesian positivist tradition has committed the tragic error of confusing the map with the territory, thinking that the contingent and arbitrary constructs through which we operate in certain social and naturecultural milieus are somewhat universal essences that speak about reality, or through which reality speaks of itself, while they are realities themselves, changing and partial.

Yet the old question arises: do we need a subject for a body to be? Do we need a subject for actions to happen? Or rather are not actions always and already subjectless, preceeding and exceeding the subject? More importantly we should ask ourselves, why have we so stubbornly attempted to foreclose action to the domain of the subject or of the unitary body?

Indeed we could say subjectivity is:

- a deceptive illusion, an effect of the fixation of perception
- an effect of larger complex aggregates of the fields of forces
- a social disease that divorces us from the environment

Much as we, early 21st century cyborgs, are emebedded and traversed, indeed contructed by all sorts of structures (metastable fields of forces tending to fixity) that attempt to hold together the image of a subject, and therefore of the social, bodies are constantly challenging this pervasive territorialisation, exceeding it in endless lines of flight.

What if we think of naturecultural ecosystems which, instead of being obsessed with control, with the impossible replication and simulation of an everchanging reality, what if we would imagine an entirely different ecology in which emergence of the new is fostered rather than hindered or appropriated?

There is a tragic misreading of capitalism, whereby some intellectuals pretend that it fosters the endless emergence of difference in desire: what it fosters is the endless preemption of emergent desire and its standardisation in niches, therefore its death.
An ecology of emergence, in going beyond unitary formations, exceeds also multiplicity and difference, since difference implies a dualistic confrontation with sameness; and points towards amorphousness, the unintelligible: a world that is not transforming (changing from one form to another, from one identity to another) but rather aforming, an amorphogenesis, an endless process of amorphous becoming that does not rely on the subjection to form and identity.

Dualistic singularity ----> multiplicity ----> motion & becoming ----> the amorphous

Singular Stable reality---> multiple stable reality ---> multiple reality in Transformation ---> Aforming reality

Some will argue that "humans" need identity, categorisations, forms, in order to live, or that such constructs have brought about extraordinary "developments" in civilisation. Indeed humans may need such constructs, the question is do we want to be humans at all? Hasn't posthumanist criticism spoken already earnestly enough about the dangers and limitations of affirming such an account of the human? Also I would say that it is not possible to know what the human is or needs, since that changes in different places, and times, and from one body to another. And indeed perhaps this dependence on categorisation is a kind of disease of the species, indeed a dangerous one, rooted in colonial traditions, whose result is a systemic violation of the planet and its inhabitants. This is not to say that all categorisations are invalid: what is invalid is their essentialist dogmatic character, their fictions of total apprehensions of the world, and after all, is that not what they have been bred to produce?

What is a singular body? A node, arbitrarily discreteziced and territorialised, within a much larger and open ecology of relations. What we may call a nodal body is a changing arbitrary node within larger metabodies of relations.

What is the awareness of such a body after all?

According to premovement theories, movement is initiated in the body always around half a second before so-called conscious awareness of it arises. This poses an interesting, possibly unanswerable question to those who seek to territorialise consciousness: since it comes always afterwards, where is the place for the subject and its free will?

Furthermore, if we think of bodies as fields of relational forces in motion, whenever I am aware of something it is always too late... the body is already becoming something other.

Indeed awareness is never of a reality, but it is a reality in itself. Awareness is not of an experience, but it is an experience in itself.
The reflexive movement of awareness is in itself a movement of experience, different from that which it tries to apprehend.

Do we need that kind of experience? Is it not an unnecessary added dimension of experience? Is it really unavoidable? Certainly not.

Problematising awareness of course implies looking at very different kinds of consciousness and of moments and instances in which it is uncertain: the limits of awareness. What is the awareness of a performing musician as she plays, or of a dancing body as it dances, or of a painter in the act of painting? Whenever we abandon the realm of signifiers and meanings, it is difficult to define awareness, since after all, what is it that we are aware of when hearing music for example? Some will argue that we are aware of musical forms, pitches, rhythms, melodies, harmonies... but those are arbitrary and discrete accounts of listening and of music. Myself as a musician cannot define what it is that I am aware of when playing the piano, indeed I could say that the most intense creative moments arise when I am not aware, when I get loose of awareness... when I am becoming other.... only later, too late perhaps, does the rational subject try to go back to such moments in an attempt to territorialise them. So awareness is always too late in its attempt to form a coherent subject and to subject bodies to control.

And what about language: some will argue that structures of language are doubtlessly apprehended as abstract structures, like those of mathematics, pure ideas... But language is again no such abstract disembodied territory of ideas, it is also the effect of moving bodies: verbal movement, choreographies of writing, which through a never identical reiteration tend to discretize movement into syllables, words and phrases. But even here and now, as I speak and read to you, the non verbal is challenging any universal account of signifiers and meanings, so that I cannot know how each of you is embodying the movements (affects) of language that this body is disseminating: there is no such thing as pure verbal language, divorced from non verbal motion. The impossibility to hold and affirm the universality of signifiers lies precisely there: in the tragic misreading of 150 years of philosophy that has believed in language per se, ignoring that it is also a kind of relational movement, and that what you embody in the relation are unpredictable forces, or affects, whereby what is relevant is not to understand, but to be productively affected or impinged upon for the generation of something new.

The fictions of categories and forms are thus the effect of several different technologies of standardised perception, foundational to the humanistic dream, that fix vision into image recognition, and verbal movement into language. The framing of the book page is thus corresponding to the framing of the photographic camera, the screen, the stage or the wall in presupposing an external observer that looks and identifies and discretizes from a distance. Perception is entirely mediated by this framing, we have embodied the technologies of perception, and look into the world as if through the framing of a photographic apparatus. What is conditioned hereby is not only the representation of the body, but first of all the way it perceives and senses, which is the condition of possibility of representation.
Some again will give a variety of different examples in which awareness of categories, forms or signs, is necessary to survive or lead a "better" life: lets say, awareness of traffic lights in a city. Well of course, modern cities are such unecological milieus in which that kind of awareness is required.... But do we want to live in such milieus?

When walking around a city we seek to interpret signs, identify subjects, and move accordingly in the appropriate scale... being able to do so makes us into able subjects and not being able discards us as disabled or even non-human.

What kind of awareness is that however, this ever-too-late awareness? Is it not an artificial condition of certain economic regimes? The animal that survives in the forest, does it have such an awareness? Does it identify? Can we know at all what kind of awareness it has?

Now, what other kinds of awareness are there that do not rely upon identification of form and meaning?

Why at all are we so desperate about defining a consiousness that relies on such conditions? Is it not still part of the humanistic dream, to set us on a pedestal of superiority, that makes us distinct to species that we at least cannot say for sure that they have the capacity to identify the way we do? Lucky them, who cannot control....

Yet in my view this sort of identification is neither an advantage nor a necessity, perhaps it is something that we have yet to overcome, an atavic naturecultural feature of the human that we posthumans still carry and don't want to let go.

What different kinds of consciousness are we traversed and constituted by, like metropolitan, mass media, videogame, hollywood, porn, comercial music, or facebook consciousness? These exceed individual consciousness but construe a fiction of collectivity that is vertically designed from above in a truly fascistic and totalitarian manner.

Rather than thinking of awareness as a means to control reality we should start to redefine it as a means to transform it and ourselves within it. Awareness and consciousness as creative actions that produce reality rather than control and replicate it.

Our awareness of the world is mediated by the primacy of totalising visions, framed in the screen, the stage or the canvas, mapped in globes... fictions of totality... of God... that is representation. But again representation, or lets say images, do not represent, they produce in themselves a reality.

Perceptions of the body are mediated by such pervasive imagery, which doesn't describe, but creates particular kinds of bodies and relations in which our lives are
foreclosed to the fiction of the I and the we, and opposed to the fiction of the other. The fiction of the individual mind.

But there is no such thing as the mind; thinking is always a bodily process, indeed one of bodies in motion and relation: movements of thought are relational motion. The body-image of the brain is one of the most unfortunate and pervasive attempts to isolate the mind and therefore consciousness, in an abstract disembodied territory.

Body images pervade all domains of science and culture and will be the subject of increasing concern in such domains as bioethics and genetic engineering, where transhumanists project an exponential multiplication of capitalism through unchallenged accounts of the good, and an eugenics of improvement and enhancement, while neurolinguistics attempts to subdue consciousness to the demands of the market in yet another massive preemptive appropriation, therefore production, of consciousness and subjectivity, (in reality of affects): through defining behaviours and functionings neuroscience produces them rather than describing what in any case would be a contingent and partial modality appertaining to certain relational contexts.

Indeed body images are already matter of great concern in such domains as Human Computer Interaction, Ergonomics, Biometrics, facial recognition, artificial intelligence, virtual reality and other such disciplines of control, which rather than adapting to bodies, produce specific and standardised forms of corporeality, founded on a paradigm of simulation. Interfaces, as mediations between the face of the abstract subject and the machine, attempt to reproduce and multiply the erasure of the body, which has the contradictory effect of producing specific kinds of bodies, unaware of their relational potentials and conditions.

The humanistic project, according to Donna Haraway, starts with the constitution of gender and sex as objects of study (Parisi 2004, 34), therefore with the anatomical description of sex. The reduction of the body to anatomy, and its obsession with reducing sexuality to genital activity and reproduction, is thus foundational to humanistic dreams of bodily erasure in benefit of the rational disembodied subject that still all of our interfaces and technologies of communication in Information Society appeal to and reproduce.

Such a portrayal of fixity, of the body as image and the image as form, contradicts however most recent undertakings in neurosciences, not to speak of phenomenology, in realising that the body and consciousness are one and the same as effects of relational movement: so consciousness as an always expanded, diffuse field of relations in which there is no room for essentialist distinctions between rational consciousness that identifies forms (as an always too late event of appropriation) and other forms of consciousness: consciousness is the act of relational becoming.

Consciousness is thus no longer a reflexive action (that produces new reality) but is the potentiality of movement itself as something always virtual, something never yet actualised, something always already anticipating and becoming something other than
that which can be captured and categorised. An antiessentialist account of consciousness. This virtuality of movement is THE REAL, which can never be itself, but is always in becoming; that requires no actualisation, no extension: pure intensity in play.

Such a consciousness can never be holistic, but is always partial, since immanent and diffuse fields of relational forces cannot have external images of totality of themselves, being as they are in constant, unpredictable, virtual expansion and embedded in partial modes of relation of exchange with other fields. Consciousness is here equivalent with affection; with the feeling of the intensity and modality of the ways in which a force is affected or affects another and is affected again in feedback.

Since forces do not operate as singularities, but in infinitely complex and interrelated fields of relations, in which different temporalities and scales of affection happen, in which gravitational nodes of the forces may form, accounting for the stratification of forces, in which endless unpredictable lines of flight are also emerging, the awareness of affection may happen at any of the strata or scales, of the nodal bodies and the metabodies that are interacting:

- atomic, molecular, bacterial consciousness
- individual consciousness.
- social and urban consciousness.
- animal and plant consciousness.
- machine consciousness
- media consciousness
- the Earth's consciousness and beyond

Any metabody or nodal body that is affected could be said to feel the intensity and modality of affection that it undergoes in the relational processes in which it is becoming, therefore could be said to have a consciousness. Does our particular reflexive consciousness say anything relevant beyond this, or is it but a singular modality of affection, an effect of the particular gravitational nodes that have stratified in the interaction of certain fields giving rise to subjective formations. Violence is such an affect, a modality of consciousness, a relevant one in attempting to undo the strata of relations that produce it.

Can this particular kind of consciousness really know about itself and about the world? Or does it merely project onto itself the fiction of knowing?

If we do away with this one kind of consciousness, what kind of bodily awareness do we offer: one that is stepping beyond multiplicity into the realm of the undefined: an ecology of amorphous fields of relations: perhaps and aconscious body.

Metabodies are fields of relational subjectless aconsciousness.
Attempting to fix and quantify the capacities of bodies is part of an intrinsically fascistic dream: let's open the body up to the unthinkable, to the emergence of qualitatively different becomings that we cannot quantify nor categorise.

Thinking the body as field of relational forces (affects) is an urgent political matter in times of affective capitalism, where affects and desires are produced through viral disseminations of choreographies in the bodies (the Panchoreographic), distributed through media culture and other older technologies. Setting to motion bodies that exceed given relational choreographies is at the same time a strategy of resistance to regimes of preemption and control, and the opening up of horizons for emergent relations as part of a new kind of ecology of affects, technology and natureculture.

Guattari, Deleuze, and along their line recent theorists like Luciana Parisi, propose the schizoanalytic paradigm of the abstract machines or couplings of desire and its molecular lines of flight as potentials to destabilise existing strata and give rise to new formations, yet they still rely upon the subject and the reterritorialisation of form: it's about new kinds of subjectivity that they speak. What about if we have no subjectivity whatsoever?

The question is rather: how do we set to motion such aconscious, amorphous, subjectless bodies? How will they interact with existing strata of subjectification?

First let us say that we don't offer a utopian view, since utopias are generalistic dreams for a humanity to come. We have abandoned the quest for universality. In the universe of the metabodies totalities are unfriendly and undesirable constructs, monsters of the dream of reason.

If at all we offer some technologies and techniques for becoming other. Yet these need to be appropriated by the specific fields of the metabodies and the nodal bodies, like mutating antiviruses that deprogramme without reprogramming.

This is not and exclusive politics, on the contrary such experiments in micropolitics are fully compatible with other well known forms of macropolitics, within a radically pluralistic framework in which politics has a strategic, non-essentialist drive.

**Metahumanism** is the provisional framework we propose in which the human is redefined as relational process, as movement inbetween any given structure, and beyond its boundaries. For metahumanism the human has no special value in itself: its an ecosophy, an ecological philosophy that deals with affective, technological and naturecultural ecosystems in which subjectivity is not presupposed and forms and identities not taken for granted.
**Metaformance** is the process of redefining relationality and **metamedia** is the redefinition of perceptual, relational technologies that accounts for metaformance.

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In various different metahuman metaformance projects this body has approached the issue of deprogramming bodies from the dominant choreographies of perception and relation, and setting them to motion in alternative manners.

**Microsexes >>> VIDEO** - [http://www.microsex.org/](http://www.microsex.org/)

One such project deals precisely with **undoing the anatomy of the body and therefore its destiny**. Through undoing the perceptual framework that is foundational to subjective formations a body is set to motion that is never aware of itself as a unity, but unfolds in endless amorphous becomings.

Video cameras placed on the skin, looking at the skin, anywhere on the skin, become the eyes of the body. There is no external view, vision is blurred and framing is in constant motion, there is **NO perspective**...

The effects of such apparently simple transposition of perception are many: in the undoing of bodily maps binary sex-gender categories collapse and desire opens up into the amorphous field of infinite microsexes. The controlling subject dissapears and in its place there is an action **without subject**, an aconscious body in amorphous becoming where there is no place for identification and form. Body-space is thus no longer extensive, but pure intensive becoming.

There is no quest for proprioception here: an **Otherception** is proposed where the other operates not as a fixed identity but as ongoing coming away from the proprietary self. An ongoing perception of otherness, where the other is not separate or opposed from the self, the becoming-other is in place of the self.

**Devisualising** implies that seeing is different to visualising: not all ways of seeing attempt to categorise what you see. For instance when walking around in a forest, sitting at the sea or looking at a sunset we don't necessarily identify, but rather become one with the amorphous movement of leaves in the wind, of waves, of clouds.

Devisualising resists the **violence of representation**: its brutal reification and assimilation irreducible of events of reality into regimes of categorisation and control, often for the sheer purpose of nurturing economic regimes that mostly rely upon the most aggressive misreadings for the production of the hiperreal, whether in the news, films or publicity, often assimilating difference into the most vulgar of niches: those of scandal and of fear of we monsters, that think of ourselves as promises for a different world. Representation exercises thus multiple violences at a time: of assimilating, of
misreading, of devoinding and disactivaing emergent potentials into dead niches of consumption.

Surveillance society is obsessed with visualisation. How about if we start to produce new kinds of relations that don't rely upon this strategy of control, but induce a different ecology?

Devisualising the body image - Decoreographing space >>> PHOTO + VIDEO
http://medialab-prado.es/article/desvisualizar

Working with dancers is an interesting way of challenging embodied knowledges of the body image. This requires a certain degree of unlearning of what constitutes the ground of western dance traditions. Recently working with a class of dance students in Chile I proposed them a number of improvisation exercises in which to do so. Firstly we did a devisualising exercise of the classroom itself, through using video recording devices in such a way that the framings, distances, focuses and perspectives were radically altered and explored in unusual ways, generating a different (un-)awareness of body-space and relationality. Secondly movement was improvised through an (un-)awareness of microsensations and micorelations that challenge any unitary image of the body, unlearning usual awareness is part of the process, and it is yet to be clarified whether a new kind of awareness is put in place of the older or wheter an aconscious body is set to motion that defies awareness altogether. Such relations were first internal sensations of the nodal body, then in relation to the environment, floor and walls, finally in the contact with other nodal bodies.

To finish we went out into the street and experienced three improvisation cues: slow speed, unusual occupations and movements in the street space, and unintelligible couplings with the space and other bodies. This shift to a specific space like the street, that is highly choreographed in terms of directionality, temporality and other parameters, has an even more intense effect of displacement and dissolution of usual awareness, and an *awakening of a new kind of being alive, that is not about the recognition of forms, but on the contrary, about dancing the amorphous.*

Through these exercises it is not only bodily awareness that is transformed, but space awareness also, since body IS space. Used as we are to approaching space as extensive fixed reality, we don't usually realise that space is a relational activity and that we mostly reproduce it according to given choreographies. When we transform the choreography of space, its linearity, its temporality, space's intensive character becomes evident, and the possibilities to transform it.

This production of real body-space becomes an urgent political matter of concern in contemporary urban and media environments where space becomes increasingly hiperreal mediated by ubiquitous publicity, screens, cameras, commercial music and interfaces of all sorts.
In another project, European Tele-Pleateaus, we explored the possibilities of putting telematics upside down in order to generate accounts of presence without identity. Since telematics mostly relies on reproducing frameworks of representation and therefore discrete identities and forms, how about if we try to use telecommunication technologies in such away that no recognisable forms and identities are available, but still there is a presence?

All of these and other projects deal with the production of illegible affects.

Affects encompass any modality of relation of the forces that constitute reality. Feelings and emotions are specific domains of affects that identify a human subject.

As such feelings and emotions are a fundamental way of awareness of the body. Yet in order to open up the body to yet unthinkable modalities of relation (affects) we need to realise the constructed character of emotions, deprogramme their choreographies and open relational movement to yet unchoreographed domains.

Instead of being aware as subjects of a body through totalising images, lets attempt to be alive as bodies aware of the affects they are embedded in, thus avoiding the violence executed for the sake of the individual, and prompting new ecologies and immanent ecosystems in which all that the nodal body relates to is constituting it as part of multiple metabodies, not as an identity, fixity or essence, but as a relational becoming.

Deprogramming techniques cannot have a general implementation: each nodal body and metabody needs to adapt and mutate the choreographic antiviruses through which dominant relationalities are deprogrammed and emergent ecosystems are set to motion.

What we eventually need is a paradigm of unpredictable mutations of the deprogramming strategies. Transversality, as proposed by Guattari, is one fundamental technique for this, which implies the constant motion between existing strata and territories. Such attempts we perform through the group called Mutant Bitches in the 15M assembly movement in Spain, where the bitches act as viral agents for installing gender strykes, species strykes and other forms of disobedience to dominant behaviours and categories.
Deprogramming all the viruses of choreographic contagion through which individual and subjective consciousness is reproduced is very broad and necessary a task for the production of new accounts of a conscious relational being alive.

AffectA >>> WEB - http://www.affecta.org/

AffectA is a metalaboratory in which to:
- investigate existing affective and relational formations in the individual, social and planetary scales and the modalities of violence inherent to them
- investigate and produce new kinds of affective and relational formations and technologies that seek to induce a relational ecology.

Areas of transdisciplinary transversal research include:
- the arts
- media and communication technologies
- bioethics and biology
- architecture and urban planning
- economy and consumption
- laws and proprietary rights
- human rights and rights of the earth vs. posthuman/metahuman ecologies
- political systems
- etc.

A relational ecology is one in which affective, technological and naturecultural ecosystems are set to motion which foster the emergence of novelty, heterogeneity and the imponderable, while hindering the emergence and sustainment of violent power relations as those implicit in the subject-object divide and its exclusive consciousness.

Challenging proprietary accounts of consciousness production implies challenging the regime of representation and inventing hitherto unthinkable domains of relationality where the bodies, as affects, open up their codes to relational mutations beyond the fascistic dream of control, this implies redefining affects, and therefore reality, in virtual, thus real, processes of becoming.

The current dominant paradigm of control and dualistic relations of domination, is but a contingent one amongst a billion.

http://www.reverso.org/
REVERSO >>> WEB
------------------------------1 hour

DEBATE - 15 min

EXERCISE - 10 min

- Devisualisation - 2 min
- Slow motion - 2 min
- Microsensations and occupying space - 3 min
- Illegible couplings - 3 min

DEPROGRAMMING WORKSHOP - Gender & Species Stryke - 1 hour